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II.—ON A DEFECT I N THE CUSTOMARY LOGICAL 
FORMULATION OF INDUCTIVE REASONING. 
By BERNARD BOSANQUET. 
1. The point on which I desire to insist, though by no 
means new, has been brought into prominence by the attitude 
of M. Bergson, with the imitation and repetition theorists 
whom he appears to follow, to the creative and constructive 
activity of the intellect. I cite a typical passage (Evolution 
Cicatrice, p. 218) : " L'intelligence a pour fonction essentiel de 
lier le meme au meme, et il n'y a entierement adaptable aux 
cadres de l'intelligence que les faits qui se repetent."* 
Such a statement is in the sharpest possible conflict with 
the view of intellectual activity which to many of us seems 
natural and obvious. But when we refer to the most accredited 
expositions of the logical theory of Induction, which attempts 
to deal with the characteristic working of the scientific 
intelligence in the advancement of natural knowledge, we find 
them dominated by ideas which appear to justify M. Bergson's 
position. What I wish to attempt is a brief reconsideration of 
the exact meaning and function of these ideas in Inductive 
Logic. 
The basis of Induction is usually stated in some such 
formula as " Same cause, same effect." I t is unnecessary for 
our present purpose to raise the questions connected with the 
converse formula, " Same effect, same cause." It is enough to 
understand the simplest truism of Identity, that a thing does 
what it is its nature to do under given conditions,! and cannot 
do otherwise except by some change in the conditions; from 
* Cf. Tarde, Loit de Vimitation, pp. 14-15. 
+ Cf. Mr. Joseph's Introduction to Logic, ch. xis. 
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which it follows, that if, in an alleged causal nexus, the alleged 
effect is sometimes absent while the alleged cause is present, 
ceteris paribus, it is impossible that the alleged cause should be 
the real cause of the effect in question. The principle is sound, 
beyond any doubt, as far as it goes. I t is, in fact, nothing 
more than can be read off from the law of non-contradiction, 
as formulated, for example, by Plato. The same thing cannot 
behave differently to the same thing in the same relation. If 
it seems to do so (Plato's condition " at the same time " is 
superfluous), you can infer that there is a difference in the 
supposed agent. The same, so far as it is concerned (i.e., if no 
condition is altered), produces the same; what produces some-
thing different, out of itself, is not the same. If this much is 
not to be assumed, we cannot treat anything as having an 
assignable nature. Truth ceases to have a meaning. Any-
thing might behave anyhow. 
Now it is from this law or truism that, according to accepted 
logical theory, the fundamental Inductive test of causal con-
nection is derived. The Inductive process is thus regarded 
as one of elimination.* You have before you, it is assumed, 
one or more suggested connections of cause and effect, and 
you labour to eliminate from among them all alleged causes 
that are present in the absence of effects with which they 
claim to be connected. Such elimination leaves, it is pre-
sumed, a surviving statement which approaches more and 
more closely to a true, i.e., an invariable, causal connection. 
The principle is simply that which M. Bergson refers to : 
What is the same, does the same; if the same product is not 
there, the same agent is not there. The same produces the 
same. And yet, if this were all, we should have a difficulty 
* The rules of elimination which depend on the further principle 
*' Same effect, same cause " (i.e., on the exclusion of plurality of causes), 
rest merely on a more precise consideration of the ideal of identity, which 
it is not necessary to take account of in order to understand the point at 
issue in this discussion. See Joseph, ch. zxii. 
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in denying M. Bergson's doctrine which I began by stating. 
I t would then seem to be the case that the essential work of 
the intellect lies in binding the same to the same, and that 
the true type of the logical universal—the essence of cogni-
tion—would be, as M. Bergson says, the relation of an abstract 
statement to examples which repeat, its tenor wholly without 
variation. That water boils at sea level at 212° Fahr. would 
be such a generality ; and according to the number of instances 
in which people boiling their kettles at or near sea level* found 
the water to be about 212°, would be its rank and power as 
a piece of knowledge. 
2. But why should we deny M. Bergson's doctrine ? 
Perhaps it may be the truth. As a prima facie answer to this 
suggestion, we need only refer to such a criticism of tautology 
as we find, for example, in Mr. Bradley's Principles of I^ogic.f 
M. Bergson's doctrine is logically bound to deny not only 
the advance from one truth or connection of fact to another, 
but the possibility of apprehending or of uttering any 
significant truth at all. I t may appear that this criticism 
is exaggerated, because the doctrine explicitly treats (so far as 
I am aware) as outside the principle of the intelligence, only 
the difference between the corresponding terms of one nexus 
and those of another nexus, and not the difference between the 
terms themselves—alleged cause and alleged effect—which are 
constituents of a single nexus. But there is no escape by this 
road. If tautology is the principle of the intelligence, the 
connection of any two distinct terms, say, as cause and effect, 
stands on the same ground as the connection between two 
different connections. With tautological identity as the 
principle of intelligence, all systematic coherence, between 
* I am satisfied to take a case in which strictly accurate repetition is 
all but impossible, because it illustrates the real fact, -which is that the 
interest of the generality lies in the differences which it binds together. 
A strict repetition could have no interest at all. 
+ E.g., p. 29. 
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term and term, equally as between judgment and judgment, 
inevitably vanishes. 
But in fact there is (i) some misinterpretation involved in 
setting up the principle " Same produces same" as the 
dominant principle of scientific Induction and as governing 
the nature of the generalisation which is the aim of that, 
process; although 
(ii) I admit and maintain that the current logical statement 
of the theory of Induction lays itself open to this misinterpre-
tation. 
(i) When yon postulate as the basis of Inductive Inference, 
the principle " Same cause, same effect," you do not mean that 
the effect is the same as the cause.* They must be different, 
if the relation of cause and effect is to be worth establishing. 
You do mean (a) that assuming the truth of an alleged causal 
nexus A—B, it only applies in cases which are absolute 
repetitions of it, i.e., where you have exactly the same A as 
before without any variation; and ($) that in examining the 
truth of an alleged causal nexus A—B, your rule must be that 
if you find a case in which, ceteris paribus, B is different 
(0 or Bi) and A is unvaried, your alleged causal nexus A—B is 
disproved. For if it were true, the same cause would be 
producing, ceteris paribus, two different effects, which is impos-
sible. (If A is plural and B singular, this is not literally 
a case excluded by the formula " Same cause, etc.," which is 
strictly taken silent about it, and no negative inference 
follows, unless we are making what usually counts as an 
additional postulate " Same effect, same cause.") 
What you mean by " Same produces same," then, is an 
assertion that the cause, in a nexus guaranteed by this 
* In a remote sense some such meaning might be assigned to the true 
Inductive principle which I desire to see established, and it may be that 
some hint of this possibility prevents the formula under discussion from 
seeming as naked as it really is. Its strict meaning can only be that 
stated in the text. 
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principle, is unvarying compared with itself, and the effect 
unvarying compared with itself. You imply no comparison 
between cause and effect. 
And your principle makes no suggestion towards the 
estimation of any possible cause and effect allied to or 
developed out of those forming the nexus whose truth we 
assume to be accepted. According to a proper interpretation 
of the word " same" some such expansion would be permis-
sible, passing from a—b to a—/S and from a.—y9 to A—B. But 
what makes it impossible is the demand for a methodic rule. 
Plainly there cannot be a general rule that will tell how much 
variation in your cause and effect, each from each, will be 
justified under the principle " Same cause, same effect." And 
therefore, if you want a rule, you must take one which 
justifies no variation at all, and makes your " generalisation" 
cover nothing but sheer repetitions, and degrades your 
procedure in connecting the same with the same into one 
which admits of no novelty or true inference. 
But the two types of connection thus disregarded, that of 
cause and effect, and that of any generalisation and its more 
advanced but kindred form, really contain the very life and 
mainspring of Inductive thought. How the suggestion of the 
effect B issues from the fact of the cause A ; or how the more 
complex and advanced a (dcf)—b (xyz) came to be substituted 
for the cruder A—B, this is where the real work of the scientific 
intelligence lies. This is the work of invention or discovery, 
of which the imitation and repetition theorists, whom 
M. Bergson appears to me to follow, have never succeeded in 
giving any serious account.* I t is the process by which 
isolated observations are built up into a science, through an 
assignment of conditions which is always becoming more 
systematically complete on. the one hand, and more relevantly 
precise on the other. Examples of such an inventive pursuit 
* Gf. especially Bergson, Evolution, p. 177. 
C 
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of a universal relation would be the rise of the science of 
acoustics out of the old observation that the pitch of musical 
notes has a ratio comparable with that of the lengths of the 
stretched strings which produce them; or the development 
and limitation of the conception of equi-potentiality as applied 
to organic growth in recent embryology. Here we have the 
plain fact, that it is the essential character of intelligence to 
bind different to different in binding same to same; and that 
it is for the former character that the latter is valuable, and, 
indeed, it is through the former only that the latter can exist. 
But the sameness here in question is not the sameness of 
M. Bergson's doctrine or of the formal Inductive test. We 
can see this from the nature of its aim. The universality or 
generality, which is the goal of su6h a process, is not the 
relation of the terms of an abstract judgment, term for term, 
each to each, to the terms of repeated cases which fall under 
it. It is the relation of the different terms of a judgment to 
each other, or of an organised system of conditions, repre-
senting a certain range of experience {e.g., our experience of 
musical sound or of embryonic growth), to the several con-
nected factors or conditions, whether constant or varying, 
which it embodies and explains. Its universality is not 
measured by millions of repeated instances, but by depth and 
complexity of insight into a sub-system of the world. 
(ii) The logical theory of Induction gives but scanty attention 
to this work of the universal in suggesting and pursuing new 
connections, because, for good logical reasons, it cannot be 
reduced, like the eliminative test, to something like a formal 
rule. Nevertheless, this work is the true spirit and main-
spring of the inductive advance of knowledge ; and to disregard 
it, while insisting on an eliminative test, is an error analogous 
to demanding a general criterion of truth. But truth has no 
criterion except the fuller truth. And the real interest of 
logical theory in the advance of knowledge is to note how, by 
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the analysis and purification of its conditions, a perception 
passes into an organised system of understanding. 
The existing connections or universals with which the 
mind is stored, act as clues among the new experiences which 
confront us, selecting those that are kindred or complementary, 
and inventing new systematic ideas after the manner of what 
have been called proportional systems, and by means of relative 
suggestion.* That is to say, that an existing connection of 
thought, when confronted with new matter, is able to 
reproduce itself in a new form which is at once appropriate 
to the new matter, and continuous with the connection as 
previously thought. This is not a question of reproducing 
objects of thought which have previously been connected in 
the mind. I t is a question of continuing some elements of 
such a connection into new forms of nexus, because the connec-
tion between the new objects has a real kinship with the 
connection between the old, although differentiated by the 
nature of the new objects themselves, and made, as a connec-
tion, something new, and not a repetition of what it was 
before, like the continuation of a varying curve from the datum 
of a given fragment of it.f Such a continuation is plainly not 
a repetition, and I think that in view of the current theory 
of Inductive generalisation, the notion of repetition as a con-
dition of knowledge is not meant to apply to such an inventive 
construction as that of which I am speaking. 
Let us look at an example. In recent embryological 
* Cf. Stout, Anal. Psych., II , p. 80. I note that Professor Stout here 
observes that relative suggestion " would not of itself enable (the dis-
coverer) to fix in exact detail the special variations." In the case he is 
dealing with, calculation was necessary. In our instance from embry-
ology, observation is necessary. But it seems to me that the question 
what calculation ? what observation ? is answered by the governing idea 
in both cases, and the relevant conclusions are selected by it, and it is it 
that they develop. 
t Cf. Bradley's Principles of Logic, p. 281, ff. 
C 2 
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discussions,* covering the old ground of preformation and epi-
genesis, we read of experiments which primd facie suggest two 
precisely opposite causal connections. 
Half an ovum, we are told, in certain cases will produce 
only half an embryo; but in other cases the half ovum may 
develop into a perfect embryo. The former fact suggests a 
complete preformation of the organism, each part of it in a 
fixed part of the ovum; the latter suggests that the ovum has 
a structure of which " every part may become anything." I t is 
of great logical interest to look at the course which these 
two alleged types of connection have imposed upon Inductive 
research. Sheer prelocalised preformation is an idea, it would 
seem, that the experiments undertaken to confirm it immediately 
destroy. And if a universal nexus had no power of developing 
into novelty, this check would have been checkmate, and the 
idea would have been dead. But a universal can take on 
new shapes as demanded by new matter; and though, as it 
seems, the " mosaic theory " (of the independent preformation of 
parts) must be abandoned in its rigid shape, yet the most 
various experiments on the tissues of organisms in later stages 
have shown that some of these are necessary to the development 
of some organs, and that therefore something essential to special 
development (perhaps " organ-forming substances") is pre-
formed, though not necessarily pre-localised. The logical 
interest is, that the idea of preformation, disputed in its 
primary and rigid shape, has been able to act as a clue to new 
experiments in a different region, such as to confirm it when 
restated in a more subtle and flexible form. 
So with the idea that every part of the ovum has the 
capacity of becoming a whole. I t is easily seen that this 
capacity is limited, and is sooner or later lost; but the idea of 
the kind of causation at work modifies itself according to the 
* My example is drawn from Driesch's Gilford Lectures and Jenkin 
son's Experimented Embryology. 
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limitations which are discovered, and seems to suggest new 
lines of research which promise to account both for the 
capacity, and for its limitation and arrest. And the logical 
interest is, that by means of this suggestion, that of " organ-
forming substances " and their distribution, it appears as if the 
two universals in question, " preformation" and " epigenesis," 
might coalesce in an idea different from either, but satisfying 
the requirements of both. 
Of course I am offering no opinion upon the value of these 
investigations. I only adduce them as striking examples of the 
ordinary course of a universal in its Inductive development. 
What works throughout is a continuity through differences; and 
its value is in the differences it connects. This is throughout 
the essence of creation and invention, which permeates the whole 
of life, aud so everyday a process as the use of language is a 
striking example of it. No one ever used the same word twice 
in precisely the same sense; in " finding the right word " there 
is always a creative effort. 
Now the general rules of Inductive elimination, based on 
" Same produces same," are simply the minimum negative 
criterion of truth, and can do by themselves no Inductive work 
at all. To rely on them alone is to reduce Induction to trial 
and error.* 
3. Thus, I do not think it is true to say that " Same cause, 
same effect," is the basal principle of Induction; and if this is 
so, there ceases to be any ground for maintaining that it is the 
essential function of the intelligence to connect the same with 
the same. The true principle I should rather state in some 
* I t is a subtlety that in fact the underlying positive nature of 
negation often asserts itself, and the " just-not a gives just-not b" affords 
a positive extension of the nature of a and b respectively, which may be 
theoretically valuable, see my Logic, II , p. 136. Thus in Driesch's Tubu-
laria experiment, it is now alleged, the capacities of different cells are 
just not equal, as they just belong to different elements of the body. 
And this suggests that differentiation is present in a certain degree—a 
positive correction and extension of Driesch's conclusion (Jenkinson, 292 n.). 
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such form as that every universal nexus tends to continue 
itself inventively in new matter. I t is true that to guide this 
process we can have no general criterion, because, as we have 
said already, the only criterion of truth is the fuller truth—the 
science at a more developed stage. And, therefore, there can be 
no rules for it, and it tends to drop out of logical theory. But 
none the less, it is this process to which the whole positive con-
struction or invention of our inductive knowledge is due ; while 
the principle " Same produces same" can only eliminate what, 
having been suggested, is found on further trial not to produce 
the minimum characteristic of a real nexus. We have seen, 
indeed,* how a good experiment may sometimes reveal a correla-
tion of serial variations, which is in itself a positive expansion of 
the suggested nexus. But this is only incidental to the strict 
process of Inductive Elimination. 
The neglect of the positive continuity between differences 
as the inventive factor in Induction appears to me to show 
itself in the doctrine that Inductive progress consists strictly 
in mere elimination of the unfit.f in reducing the number of 
nexuses that can claim the position of the true invariable 
law. This doctrine seems to me to subordinate the more 
important process and element of proof, because it can have 
no abstract criterion, to the less important, which is nothing 
but an abstract criterion. But if the aim of logic is not to 
give rules of practice, but to understand the nature of know-
ledge, this ground of subordination is invalid, and it remains 
true that the mainspring of inductive advance in natural 
knowledge, as of knowledge in general, is the power of ideas 
to make experience coherent, and that therefore the demand 
of continuity between term and term or between nexus and 
nexus—of a positive explanatory character attaching to the 
* P. 31 and p. 37 footnote. 
t See Bradley's criticism of one form of Disjunctive reasoning, 
Principles of Logic, p. 515. 
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nexus—is a fundamental requirement of inductive science, 
-which is in fact merely an elementary stage of knowledge, 
and shares all its positive characters.* 
4. The modification outlined above in the idea of Induc-
tive universality or generalisation follows from this conception. 
The value of an Inductive conclusion, as of any piece of 
knowledge, lies in the amount of reality which it enables us 
to grasp, and this is very slightly tested by the number of 
cases in which the * nexus is repeated in fact. And if the idea 
of identical repetition could be realised (which it cannot, foi 
every so-called repetition is differenced by a new context) the 
frequency of recurrence would have no connection with 
universality at all. 
What is here advocated as the true view of Inductive 
advance has been suggested by Green's treatment of logical 
theory,f and has in some degree been embodied by the writer,{ 
at the point where he deals with true Inductive generalisation 
as consisting in the range of differing data and conditions 
welded into a system by any investigation, as contrasted with 
the number of recurrent cases which may fall under a single 
abstract statement, and there is a definite logical necessity 
for making the former type of universal the goal to which the 
latter is a halfway house or less. For, as Plato§ pointed out 
and as Mr. Bradleyll has recently emphasised, statements of 
fact (implicit statements of nexus) but slightly hedged with 
conditions, must always be at the mercy of unexpressed factors 
for their truth or falsehood. They tumble backwards and 
forwards between " is " and " is no t" ; Plato's famous expres-
sion, which Mr. Bradley's argument in the passage just referred 
* See, however, Mr. Joseph's example from the discontinuity between 
physical cause and psychical effect, p. 453. I think it could be discounted, 
t Works, II, pp. 288-90. 
X Logic, II , pp. 169-70, and 174. 
§ Rep., p. 479, c. 
|| Mind, No. 72, 499. 
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to strictly and precisely justifies. The remedy, as Mr. Bradley 
says, is to get the conditions into the subject; and this means 
either an explicit or an implicit reference to a complete system.* 
The normal and natural working of intelligence, then, is 
creative and constructive, tending towards the concrete and to 
continuity within differences. The universality which is its 
mainspring is in itself a nisus to the concrete. This operative 
continuity is not represented by the linkage of the same to the 
same. Its law—the law of intelligence—is not the law of 
Identity, unless the law of Identity is construed in a way that 
takes it deep into the postulates of organic systematisation.f 
And phenomena which should merely repeat themselves would 
present an absolute barrier to the central nisus of the intellect. 
Mere repetition, in fact, if it were possible, would be incom-
patible with understanding. 
1 am, therefore, still confident that the restriction of 
Inductive proof to the disqualification of competing hypotheses 
is a fundamental error of principle.! What really works in the 
proof is the same as what works in the discovery, the power, 
that is, of an idea to harmonise experience. No doubt the 
hypothesis which best satisfies this condition would also be the 
least likely to fall a victim to the rule of elimination. But 
yet, theoretically speaking, if accepted for this latter reason, 
it is accepted, so it seems to me, for the wrong reason, and its 
value as knowledge is not genuinely apprehended. But this 
point is only incidental to my discussion, and I will not pursue 
it here. 
* See my Logic, I, p. 260, for judgments which imply, though they 
do not expressly include, a relevant scientific system. 
t See my Logic, II , pp. 207-8. 
J I am afraid that here I find myself in opposition to Mr. Joseph, 
whose Logic I greatly admire. There is perhaps a difference in what we 
call " Induction." But I could not admit a distinction of principle. For 
my ultimate answer to the d'ajunctive theory of Induction, see my 
Logic, II , p. 106. 
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
